diversity relates directly to their educational mission. Affirmative action programs premised on diversity are less vulnerable to legal challenge because the Supreme Court has deemed the promotion of diversity on university campuses a compelling state interest; schools may thus take race explicitly into account when making admissions decisions. 3 In contrast, affirmative action programs designed as reparation for the harm done by past discrimination are vulnerable to constitutional challenge if a particular school has not itself practiced racial discrimination in the past. 4 Affirmative action programs founded on notions of distributive justice that hope to promote the future success of members of specific racial groups are even more constitutionally vulnerable; the state interest of undoing the consequences of past societal discrimination (as opposed to state-enforced discrimination) in order to insure the future success of a group has been held to be too amorphous an interest to justify taking race into account when making admissions decisions.5
My discussion of the structure of many schools' affirmative action programs begins with the premise that race and ethnicity are socially constructed concepts.
There is nothing immutable about the definition or content of racial categories.
Although people from different "races" share certain gross morphological similarities, there is no gene or cluster of genes that determine race.6 Whatever physical or genetic differences exist are inconsequential to our daily lives and to public policy. Their only importance is that which we attribute to them. "Race" is thus a conclusion we come to-a category that represents decisions and biases influenced by many different factors. Because race is socially constructed, we can disagree about the proper way to draw racial lines.
Much the same can be said about ethnicity. Indeed, the difference between race and ethnicity is sometimes unclear and contested.7 Ethnic categories can be seen as divisions among groupings of people within a given "race," generally based more on cultural similarities among people than on perceived physical differences between the group and others.8 But because ethnicity is related to culture, it is, if anything, a more elusive concept than race. Culture is not an inherited characteristic; it is a practice or group of practices. As such, it too is constructed and, in theory at least, mutable.
The United States Census, for example, has a racial classification for Asians and an ethnic classification for Hispanics. Both categories define people according to their own or their ancestors' geographic origins. But the contours of these categories are subject to debate, as is the question whether these groupings are "racial" or "ethnic" in any meaningful sense at all. Some definitions of the racial category Asian, for example, include persons of Pakistani or Indian descent, while other definitions do not.9 Some include persons of Pacific Islander descent, while others consider Pacific Islanders racially distinct.10 Recently, the term Latino has begun to replace the term Hispanic. As the terms have evolved, the definition of generally not considered Latinos, who are persons of Central and South American descent. That people can disagree over who is Asian or Latino (or Hispanic) underlines the social constructedness of race and ethnicity and the blurred line between the two concepts. Professor David Hollinger's observation that the category Latino has come to be a category with race-like overtones further emphasizes the constructedness of race. As Hollinger points out, until relatively recently (perhaps twenty years ago) people within this category were generally considered racially "white." But Latino is increasingly referred to more and more as a race.
In fact, the National Council of La Raza has asked the Census to reclassify Hispanic as a race rather than as an ethnicity for the next census."
Because there is no biological definition of race or ethnicity, these concepts must be socially defined. In defining them for the purposes of administering affirmative action in admissions processes, schools must face at least three distinct issues. First, they must decide which individuals belong to which races and ethnicities. For example, is a person Asian American, African American, or something else if her mother is Asian American and her father is African American?
Is a person Mexican American or white if her father is Mexican American and her mother is Irish? At what point does she become one race or another, and will the school take into consideration the way she defines herself racially or the way that others define her? Do some groups assimilate more easily than others into racial or ethnic categories not normally included in diversity-based affirmative action programs? Is there a principled basis for a school to conclude, for instance, that a child of one white and one Asian parent is "white," while a child of one white and one African American parent is African American? Second, schools must determine whether racial or ethnic groups are internally uniform with respect to their contributions to diversity. If a school decides that Latino is an ethnic category, and that being a Latino will contribute to diversity, it will ask whether there are a sufficient number of Latinos on campus, but it will not necessarily consider whether there are any Salvadoran, Cuban, or Mexican Americans who attend the school. Even if all of the Latino students happen to be of just one national origin, that school might not notice or care if it is only concerned with making sure that the Latino experience is represented on campus. or who face the same problems they do as recent immigrants.
The lack of symmetry between the definition of groups within schools' affirmative action programs and the self-definition of persons within these groups is in tension with the goal of these programs to promote diversity of ideas and viewpoints through group preferences. This lack of symmetry undercuts the assumption that racial and ethnic identity play pivotal roles in defining how the members of these groups perceive and experience the world; it means that race and ethnicity may be less important than other characteristics not taken into account when deciding who should benefit from affirmative action. By choosing race or ethnicity as the proxy for diverse viewpoints and perspectives, schools may fail to consider the factors that members of these groups see as defining themselves and distinguishing themselves from other groups, which they presumably would bring to bear in campus life.
This failure subordinates the individual and group self-conception to the conceptions held by policy makers and administrators, which are likely to reflect dominant social constructions. Such programs, in other words, may fall victim to the same lack of understanding they are supposed to promote. Schools cannot expect to increase the variety of perspectives and experiences on campus without taking seriously the ways in which people actually identify themselves and identify with others. Taking a cue from critical race theorists, schools that seek to promote diversity should look to the actual experiences, history, and cultures of people when they define the groups they wish to include in their affirmative action programs.14 In doing so, schools should value the actual experience of these groups rather than express dominant social conceptions. Admittedly, any assertion that members of a particular group see themselves in a certain way will necessarily fail to capture the complexity of opinions and experiences among individuals. Thus, any definition of group membership will be subject to the attack I level here against the definition of racial and ethnic groups: all categories are incorrect at some level and for some people. Moreover, all of these groups have very different experiences as immigrants. Because these groups have each had such different immigration experiences, their contribution to a school's diversity will also be very different.
The foregoing suggests that categorization by race or ethnicity fails to capture the complexity of social experience of many groups and their members. Diversity programs that use race or ethnicity as proxies for diversity of social experience and social affiliation may thus fail to capture accurately the perceptions and experiences of the groups they seek to include. As a result, real diversity may suffer.
Thus, when deciding whom to admit through affirmative action, schools should pay closer attention to the ways in which individuals and groups define themselves rather than defaulting to the socially dominant understanding of who belongs to what race or ethnicity. Instead of having students "check the box" for a given racial or ethnic category, schools could ask more open-ended questions, perhaps asking applicants to explain how they define themselves racially, ethnically, or otherwise. Giving students a limited range of racial or ethnic categories to choose from presupposes strong affiliations even when in actuality they may be weak.
From the responses to these questions, schools could devise categories that more accurately reflect different groups' and individuals' conceptions of identity and affiliation.
If the use of race and ethnicity as proxies for diversity of thought and experience is not an effective means of promoting such diversity, then the idea of affirmative action based on race or ethnicity may be undermined, at least insofar as it is meant to achieve diversity. At the very least, this insight requires us to change our conclusions about how to define the groups that we think must be included to achieve diversity. Such altered definitions may in turn affect our conclusions as to which groups ought to benefit from affirmative action. If we resist giving up affirmative action based on race or ethnicity as a method to increase diversity on campus, it may not be because we fear that schools will become less diverse in the ideas and attitudes represented on campus; we may instead resist because we are motivated by goals other than diversity, such as reparations or distributive justice. Although race and ethnicity may not accurately reflect the self-perception of many groups, these categories are socially salient because throughout our history people have been given better or worse treatment based on their perceived race or ethnicity. Racial and ethnic categories may not serve the educational mission of diversity very well, but they may do a better job of serving the goals of reparations and distributive justice. Schools may feel constrained, however, to limit their stated objectives to diversity and to conceal genuine redistributional or reparationist objectives because of Bakke, which allows schools to take race explicitly into account to promote educational diversity, but greatly limits their ability to do so for the purposes of reparations or distributive justice. Complete candor may be too risky.
Putting Bakke to the side for analytic purposes, however, a school can tailor an affirmative action program to fulfill its true goals only if it is clear about the nature of these goals. Different objectives will lead to different conclusions about which groups should be included in an affirmative action program and how these groups should be defined. If a school is motivated by distributional goals, racebased programs work well for some groups but less well for others.40 For example, a school could defensibly grant affirmative action preferences to African Americans on the theory that affirmative action would help improve the socioeconomic status and political power of African Americans as a group. The long history of discrimination against African Americans and the importance of race to the social identity of African Americans make race a fairly useful category for analysis and for achieving the goals of distributive justice and reparations.41
It would be much more difficult, however, to make an analogous argument with regard to Latinos. Because Latino panethnic identity is relatively weak compared to other kinds of affiliations, granting affirmative action to racially or ethnically Latino students would likely not serve a school's distributional or reparations goals. A program more sensitive to differences among Latino nationalities and the complexities of Latino group affiliation would probably serve these goals better.
The point is that in the last analysis schools should be sensitive to the actual group identities and social affiliations of students and applicants, whatever the purpose of an affirmative action program, whether it be to promote diversity, or to grant reparations, or to promote distributive justice. If schools rely only on
